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ATLANTIC CITY SPECIAL: WHETHER THE CASINO 
EXCEPTION TO THE NEW JERSEY SMOKE-FREE AIR ACT 
COMPORTS WITH THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION’S 
GENERAL PROHIBITION OF SPECIAL LAWS 
Randy Samson∗
 
April 14, 2006—Kelly’s Tavern in New Brunswick, New Jersey.  
11:50 P.M.  Almost in unison, the patrons of the small corner bar light 
up cigarettes.  The manager has announced that, come midnight, the 
ashtrays will be removed and smoking inside the establishment will be 
prohibited in compliance with New Jersey’s new indoor smoking ban.  
Grumbles of contempt provide the soundtrack as the smoke grows so 
thick that patrons struggle to see the televisions across the bar.  Ten 
minutes later, the clouds of silver begin to thin, as the tavern’s em-
ployees make good on the manager’s word and remove the ashtrays.1  
On April 15, at 12:00 A.M., Kelly’s Tavern, like hundreds of other bars 
and indoor areas across the state of New Jersey, went smoke-free.2
September 8, 2006—The Tropicana Casino and Resort in Atlan-
tic City, New Jersey.  Midnight.  A cascading array of colors, lights, 
and sounds, the classic overwhelming casino environment, provides 
the backdrop as throngs of excited gamblers try their luck at the 
countless games of chance on the casino floor.  Just as shrieks of joy 
and moans of defeat fill the air, so too does a steady flow of cigarette 
and cigar smoke, creeping between the slot machines, hanging be-
fore the surveillance cameras, engulfing patrons and employees, lo-
cals and tourists alike.  Nearly five months after the implementation 
of the New Jersey indoor smoking ban, tobacco smoke continues to 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2008, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A./B.S., 2001, 
Boston University.  The author would like to thank Professor John Wefing for his in-
valuable assistance. 
 1 This information is from the author’s personal experience. 
 2 Allison Pries & Eric Hsu, Smokers Cope with Ban; Others Relish Fresh Air, THE 
RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Apr. 16, 2006, at A1 (stating that hundreds of bars 
across New Jersey observed the smokers’ “last call” at midnight). 
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stand alongside gambling chips, free drinks, and artificial daylight as 
a mainstay of the Atlantic City casino experience.3
INTRODUCTION 
As of October 1, 2007, twenty-three states did not allow smoking 
in restaurants, and seventeen states had similar bans for all bars.4  
The trend of enacting such bans is a relatively recent one, as the old-
est took effect only fourteen years ago,5 and over one-third of the 
bans took effect in the past two years.6
These statewide indoor smoking bans, while typically broad in 
their definition of establishments covered by the ban, generally pro-
vide for some narrow exceptions.7  For instance, New York forbids 
smoking in all “places of employment[,] bars [, and] food service  
establishments.”8  However, this broad language is later narrowed in 
the statute by exceptions to the smoking ban for, among other estab-
lishments, “[r]etail tobacco businesses[,] [m]embership organiza-
tions . . . [and] [c]igar bars.”9  Likewise, the Colorado Clean Air Act’s 
prohibition of smoking “in any indoor area” excludes casino floors 
and cigar bars from the statute’s otherwise broad purview.10
As would be expected, the number of legal challenges to these 
statewide bans and their exceptions has grown, particularly in the 
form of federal constitutional challenges, as the bans have taken ef-
 3 This information is from the author’s personal experience. 
 4 AM. NONSMOKERS’ RIGHTS FOUND., STATES AND MUNICIPALITIES WITH 100% 
SMOKEFREE LAWS IN WORKPLACES, RESTAURANTS, AND BARS 3, 4 (2006), http:// www.no-
smoke.org/pdf/100ordlist.pdf.  These numbers do not include those states that 
merely require separate areas for smokers in such establishments, nor do they in-
clude bans that allow for exceptions based on the size of the establishment.  Id. 
 5 Gene Borio, Tobacco Timeline: The Twentieth Century 1950–1999—The Bat-
tle Is Joined, http://www.tobacco.org/resources/history/Tobacco_History20-2.html 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2007); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1742 (2006). 
 6 Borio, supra note 5; AM. NONSMOKERS’ RIGHTS FOUND., supra note 4. 
 7 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-14-204 (2006) (prohibiting smoking “in any in-
door area,” with statutory exceptions); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 270, § 22 (LexisNexis 
2006) (listing more than twenty classes of indoor areas in which smoking is prohib-
ited, including bars and restaurants); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-58 (West 2006) (stating 
that “[s]moking is prohibited in an indoor public place or workplace,” unless other-
wise provided for in the statute). 
 8 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-o (Consol. 2006). 
 9 Id. § 1399-q. 
 10 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-14-204, -205; see also, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 
1542 (2005) (excluding, among other establishments, bingo halls and off-track bet-
ting facilities from otherwise broad indoor smoking prohibition); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-
20.10-6 (2005) (excluding, among other establishments, retail tobacco stores, and 
smoking bars from otherwise broad indoor smoking prohibition). 
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fect across the country.11  In New York, a lobbying group formed to 
promote the interests of smokers assailed the previously described 
smoking ban on a host of constitutional grounds, including substan-
tive Due Process, procedural Due Process, Equal Protection, the 
Right to Travel, Freedom of Speech, and Freedom of Assembly.12  
Similarly, owners and operators of restaurants authorized to sell alco-
holic beverages in Connecticut mounted a more narrow challenge to 
that state’s indoor smoking ban and, more specifically, the statute’s 
exception of casinos on Native American tribal lands and private 
clubs, alleging that the exception constituted a violation of federal 
equal protection.13  However, while the number of these challenges 
has mounted, all have proven unsuccessful.14
On January 15, 2006, New Jersey joined the ranks of states enact-
ing general prohibitions of smoking in indoor areas, including bars 
and restaurants, by passing the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act.15  As 
have all other states with such bans, New Jersey scaled back the ini-
tially broad language of its general prohibition by classifying certain 
indoor areas as outside the scope of the statute.16  Among the classes 
of indoor areas exempted from the statute are casinos.17
The purpose of this Comment is to analyze the New Jersey in-
door smoking ban from a New Jersey constitutional standpoint.  In 
particular, the Comment focuses on the exclusion of casinos from the 
statute’s purview, and whether such an exclusion comports with the 
New Jersey Constitution’s general prohibition of special, private, or 
local laws.18  Part I gives a brief history of smoking bans in the United 
States, concluding with a more detailed look at the New Jersey 
Smoke-Free Air Act.19  In Part II, the Comment examines the federal 
Constitutional challenges to state smoking bans and how those chal-
lenges have faired.20  Part III lays out the New Jersey special law analy-
sis that has evolved since the state prohibited such laws.21  Finally, Part 
 11 See infra notes 89–145 and accompanying text. 
 12 New York City C.L.A.S.H. v. City of New York, 315 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004). 
 13 Batte-Holmgren v. Galvin, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3313 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Nov. 5, 2004), aff’d Batte-Holmgren v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 914 A.2d 996 (Conn. 
2007). 
 14 See infra notes 89–145 and accompanying text. 
 15 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-55 to -64 (West 2006). 
 16 Id. § 26:3D-59. 
 17 Id. § 26:3D-59(e). 
 18 N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 7. 
 19 See infra notes 24–89 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 90–145 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 146–237 and accompanying text. 
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IV conducts a special law analysis of the New Jersey indoor smoking 
ban.22  The Comment concludes that New Jersey’s special law juris-
prudence is unclear on a subtle yet vital element of the special law 
analysis, and that the resolution of this grey area will likely determine 
whether the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act’s exclusion of casinos 
renders the statute an unconstitutional special law.23
I. HISTORY OF AMERICAN SMOKING BANS AND THE  
NEW JERSEY SMOKE-FREE AIR ACT 
A. A Brief History of the Anti-Smoking Movement and State Smoking 
Bans in the United States 
Tobacco use can be described as an American practice in virtu-
ally every sense.  The world’s first tobacco plant is believed to have 
grown in the Americas in approximately 6000 B.C.24  Thousands of 
years later, Christopher Columbus’s epic voyage revealed not only the 
presence of the Americas to the Old World, but also the presence of 
certain dried leaves that the natives showed an affinity for chewing or 
“drinking their smoke” through a pipe.25  In 1619, when the first rep-
resentative legislative assembly in the American colonies met in 
Jamestown, Virginia, the first law passed regulated the sale of to-
bacco.26
For nearly as long as tobacco has been used (at least by Europe-
ans and American colonists), it has evoked disfavor and opposition.  
In 1604, King James I, an avid opponent of tobacco use, raised the 
duty on imported tobacco in England by 4000%.27  The Vatican 
passed an indoor smoking ban of sorts by forbidding smoking in Ro-
man Catholic basilicas.28  Even in the American colonies, the birth-
place of tobacco, smoking met opposition, as the colony of Massachu-
setts banned public smoking in 1632.29
 22 See infra notes 238–85 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 241–85 and accompanying text. 
 24 Gene Borio, The Tobacco Timeline, http://www.tobacco.org/resources/his 
tory/Tobacco_History.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2007). 
 25 RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES 9 (1996). 
 26 Gene Borio, Tobacco Timeline: The Seventeenth Century—The Great Age of 
the Pipe, http://www.tobacco.org/resources/history/Tobacco_History17.html (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2007). 
 27 KLUGER, supra note 25, at 10. 
 28 Id.  These anti-tobacco measures were considerably less drastic than those em-
ployed by Czar Alexis of Russia, apparently a staunch opponent of smoking, who ex-
iled smokers to Siberia.  Id. 
 29 Borio, supra note 26. 
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Medical research on the effects of tobacco use is also long on 
history, if not agreement.  The first medical report of the negative ef-
fects of tobacco use came from Samuel Pepys in 1665 after he ob-
served a Royal Society experiment in which a cat died when fed a 
“drop of distilled oil of tobacco.”30  From that point until the twenti-
eth century, conflicting accounts of tobacco’s effects emerged, rang-
ing from those touting tobacco’s medical uses31 to those depicting the 
plant’s use as a serious health risk.32
In the 1940s, evidence that tobacco use leads to a variety of dis-
eases came into clearer focus.33  Influential studies conducted by Drs. 
Ernst Wynder and Evarts Graham revealed smokers to be at a greater 
risk of developing lung cancer and, later, that mice given tobacco tar 
stood a greater chance of developing malignant tumors.34  The 
mounting evidence of the negative effects of smoking culminated in 
the 1964 Surgeon General’s report on smoking and health, which 
concluded that smoking causes lung cancer.35  These studies and re-
ports received a wide public audience, as their results were published 
in such mass platforms as The New York Times and Life magazine.36
However, while the increased evidence and awareness of the 
causal link between cigarette use and cancer were undoubtedly major 
factors in the growth of the anti-smoking movement, the medical re-
search most germane to the present-day anti-smoking legislation is 
that considering the effects of secondhand smoke.37  The Surgeon 
General, with little supporting scientific evidence at the time, first re-
ported the likely harmful effects of secondhand smoke in 1972.38  
Since then, while scientists have debated whether and to what extent 
secondhand smoke actually produces such harm, the public has 
grown less tolerant of smoking in public and the workplace, leading 
to restrictions by the government and private business.39
Even before the advancements in medical research, states had 
taken various measures to curb tobacco smoking, with varying levels 
 30 STANTON A. GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS 1 (1996). 
 31 Borio, supra note 26.  In the same year that Pepys was conducting his experi-
ment, smoking was made mandatory at Eton to ward off infection and combat the 
bubonic plague.  Id. 
 32 See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 30, at 1. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 25. 
 35 Id. at 1. 
 36 Id. at 25. 
 37 See id. at 391. 
 38 KLUGER, supra note 25, at 366. 
 39 GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 30, at 391. 
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of success.  As previously mentioned, Massachusetts had banned pub-
lic smoking for a time during its colonial period.40  The first organ-
ized anti-tobacco movement began as an adjunct to the temperance 
movement in the 1830s.41  While cigarette use enjoyed a watershed 
period in the late nineteenth century due to the introduction of 
techniques for mass cigarette production,42 opposition to cigarette 
smoking grew beyond that of other uses of tobacco,43 leading to suc-
cessful statewide restrictions.  Between 1893 and 1909, fifteen states 
passed legislation that survived judicial scrutiny banning the sale of 
cigarettes.44  However, this upsurge of anti-smoking sentiment was 
short-lived, as a combination of the beginning of World War I,45 the 
growth of smoking among women,46 and the disastrous attempt at the 
prohibition of alcohol rendered anti-smoking legislation unpopular.47  
In 1927, when Kansas dropped its ban on the sale of cigarettes, it was 
the last state in the period to do so.48
Evidence of the harmful effects of secondhand smoke breathed 
new life49 into the anti-smoking movement in the 1970s.  The year 
1973 saw the passage of the first serious statewide anti-smoking legis-
lation following the mid-century medical advancements, with Arizona 
banning smoking in libraries, theaters, museums, concert halls, and 
buses.50  Two years later, Minnesota passed its much broader Clean 
Indoor Air Act,51 prohibiting smoking in nearly all confined public 
places, including restaurants and workplaces, unless separate smok-
ing areas were provided.52  However, the shift toward greater regula-
 40 Borio, supra note 26. 
 41 Gene Borio, Tobacco Timeline: The Nineteenth Century—The Age of the Ci-
gar, http://www.tobacco.org/resources/history/Tobacco_History19.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 2, 2007). 
 42 KLUGER, supra note 25, at 19. 
 43 Id. at 37–40. 
 44 Gene Borio, Tobacco Timeline: The Twentieth Century 1900–1949—The Rise 
of the Cigarette, http://www.tobacco.org/resources/history/Tobacco_History20-1 
.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2007). 
 45 KLUGER, supra note 25, at 63–64.  Cigarettes were the only form of tobacco that 
lent itself to use in war, as other forms were viewed as unmanageable, unsanitary, or 
generally bothersome.  Id.  The cigarette companies, aware of this reality, took great 
effort to seize upon the patriotic spirit of the day, heavily advertising their contribu-
tions of cigarettes to the soldiers in battle.  Id. 
 46 Id. at 65–66. 
 47 Id. at 68. 
 48 Id. at 69. 
 49 Pun intended. 
 50 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-601.01 (LexisNexis 2006). 
 51 MINN. STAT. § 144.411 to 144.417 (2005). 
 52 KLUGER, supra note 25, at 374. 
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tion of smoking was slow; the anti-smoking statutes passed in Mon-
tana53 and Nebraska54 shortly after Minnesota’s measure were far less 
comprehensive, and restrictive measures similar to that in Minnesota 
were vetoed by the governors of Illinois and Maine.55
Still, by 1986, thirty-five states had restricted smoking on public 
transit, thirty-one in elevators, twenty-nine in cultural and recrea-
tional facilities, twenty-seven in schools, and nineteen in libraries; 
twenty-two required segregated areas in public office buildings, and 
nine required such in private ones.56  As a greater degree of agree-
ment grew on the harmful effects of secondhand smoke, the anti-
smoking movement took on a strategy of undercutting “the social 
support network for smoking by implicitly defining it as an antisocial 
act.”57  
In 1990, San Luis Obispo, California, became the first city in the 
United States to ban smoking in all public buildings including bars 
and restaurants.58  Vermont passed a broad ban on indoor smoking in 
1993,59 becoming the first state in the modern era of smoking regula-
tion to do so.60  In the thirteen years since, fourteen states have 
joined Vermont, at least to the extent of passing broad smoking bans 
that include restaurants and do not allow for separate smoking areas, 
and eleven states61 have extended such bans to bars.62
B. The New Jersey Indoor Smoking Ban 
New Jersey passed the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act on January 
15, 2006, with the statute taking effect on April 15 of the same year.63  
The statute declared the following findings as motivation for the 
measure: 
[T]obacco is the leading cause of preventable disease and death 
in the State and the nation, and tobacco smoke constitutes a sub-
stantial health hazard to the nonsmoking majority of the public; 
the separation of smoking and nonsmoking areas in indoor pub-
 53 MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-40-101 to -120 (2005). 
 54 NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-5701 to -5713 (2006). 
 55 KLUGER, supra note 25, at 375. 
 56 Id. at 557. 
 57 Id. at 553. 
 58 Borio, supra note 5. 
 59 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1742–1746 (2006). 
 60 Borio, supra note 5.  Bars were originally exempt from Vermont’s ban.  Id. 
 61 These eleven states include Vermont. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1742–1746 
(2006). 
 62 AM. NONSMOKERS’ RIGHTS FOUND., supra note 4. 
 63 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-55 to -64 (West 2006). 
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lic places and workplaces does not eliminate the hazard to non-
smokers if these areas share a common ventilation system; and, 
therefore, subject to certain specified exceptions, it is clearly in 
the public interest to prohibit smoking in all enclosed indoor 
places of public access and workplaces.64
Thus, the primary purpose of the statute, to prevent tobacco-related 
disease, particularly to the “nonsmoking majority of the public,” is 
readily apparent.65  No legislative purpose or justification is stated for 
the exceptions to the ban66 beyond the implication that the public in-
terest is not served by banning smoking in the exempt areas.67
The statute states that “[s]moking is prohibited in any indoor 
public place or workplace, except as otherwise provided in this act.”68  
Included in the exceptions provided for by the act is “the area within 
the perimeter of . . . any casino . . . that contains at least 150 stand-
alone slot machines, 10 table games, or some combination thereof 
approved by the commission, which machines and games are avail-
able to the public for wagering.”69  The casino exception applies only 
to gambling floors, not to other public areas that might be thought to 
be within the confines of the casino, such as enclosed bars and res-
taurants.70  Because the New Jersey Constitution permits casinos only 
within Atlantic City,71 the casino exception to the New Jersey indoor 
smoking statute effectively applies to only one narrow class of estab-
lishments in one geographic area. 
The reaction to the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act at this rela-
tively early point in the legislation’s lifetime has by and large re-
flected the interests of those affected.  Non-smokers generally sup-
ported the bill’s passage and have largely sung its praises since 
 64 § 26:3D-56. 
 65 Id. 
 66 § 26:3D-55 to -64. 
 67 § 26:3D-56. 
 68 § 26:3D-58. 
 69 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-59.  Other areas excluded from the statute include  
cigar bars and tobacco retail establishments.  Id.  Whether these exceptions render 
the statute a special law is beyond the scope of this Comment, although one poten-
tially but not necessarily relevant difference between these establishments and  
casinos is that these establishments are not confined to a single municipality in New 
Jersey. 
 70 Id.; see also Lisa Grzyboski, Smoking Ban Challenge Fails, COURIER-POST (Cherry 
Hill, N.J.), Apr. 14, 2006, at 1G (listing the covered and exempt classes of establish-
ments). 
 71 N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 2. 
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enactment.72  Smokers predictably, although not uniformly, have ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with the ban.73  Bar and restaurant owners 
have taken varying stances on the legislation, with some welcoming 
the opportunity to offer a smoke-free environment without worrying 
about the loss of patrons to establishments that allow smoking,74 while 
others braced for an overall decline in business,75 particularly because 
the casinos remained an option for smokers.76  At this early point, lit-
tle conclusive evidence exists on the effect, if any, the ban has had on 
the business of New Jersey restaurants and bars, although the trend in 
other states implementing smoking bans has been that the more a 
business relies on liquor sales, the more negative an effect the ban 
has had.77
One aspect of the New Jersey indoor smoking ban that has gar-
nered virtually unanimous enmity is the exception for casinos.78  Pro-
ponents of the indoor smoking ban have criticized the exception as 
contrary to the spirit of the ban, which is meant to protect employees 
and the non-smoking majority from the ailments caused by second-
 72 See, e.g., Pries & Hsu, supra note 2, at A1 (quoting a non-smoker characterizing 
the new law as an attempt to get smokers to respect the lives of those around them).  
But see id. (quoting non-smoker characterizing ban as “un-American”). 
 73 See, e.g., Grzyboski, supra note 70, at 1G (smokers describing ban as “awful” and 
“unfair”); John Holl, Customers May Follow Smoke out the Door, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006, 
§ 14NJ, at 6 (North Jersey smoker telling how he stopped going to New York after its 
smoking ban was enacted, and how he would now have to leave New Jersey); Pries & 
Hsu, supra note 2, at A1 (pack-a-day smoker describing the new law as an annoying 
imposition).  But see Richard Pearsall, New Restrictions Cause Only a Few Ripples for Busi-
nesses, COURIER-POST (Cherry Hill, N.J.), Apr. 22, 2006, at 1G (smoker saying that 
when she wants a cigarette, she simply goes outside and has one); Pries & Hsu, supra 
note 2, at A1 (smoker explaining that the new ban will help him to smoke less). 
 74 See, e.g., Holl, supra note 73, at 6 (diner manager expressing gratitude for the 
ban, as she desired to have her diner smoke-free for years but feared losing smokers 
as customers); Pries & Hsu, supra note 2, at A1 (bar and grill owner excited that 
more young families will now frequent the establishment). 
 75 See, e.g., Grzyboski, supra note 70, at 1G (restaurant manager expressing worry 
that customers of smaller New Jersey pubs will forego those establishments for bars in 
Philadelphia, where no such smoking ban exists); Tim O’Reiley, Bars Split on Smoking 
Ban: Will It Snuff Out Profits?, DAILY RECORD (Morristown, N.J.), Apr. 13, 2006 (Presi-
dent of New Jersey Restaurant Association stating that certain establishments could 
face an initial decline in business of fifteen to forty percent, and bartender describ-
ing her clientele as ninety percent smokers and stating that the bar’s management 
and employees are “freaked out about” the smoking ban and its effect on business).  
 76 See, e.g., Holl, supra note 73, at 6 (quoting an Atlantic City pub owner stating 
that “[t]his ban is going to annihilate [my business],” largely because casinos remain 
an option for smokers who wish to drink and smoke inside). 
 77 O’Reiley, supra note 75. 
 78 See Pearsall, supra note 73, at 1G (“The casino exception has become a light-
ning rod for the anger of smokers and nonsmokers alike . . . .”). 
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hand smoke.79  Opponents of the ban complain that the separate 
treatment casinos receive under the ban creates an unfair, unequal 
playing field in the competition for smoking patrons.80  Both sides 
criticize the exception as “blatant favoritism for a powerful indus-
try.”81
Statements from the New Jersey legislators that passed the ban 
have done little to quell such criticism.  As one New York Times article 
stated, “lawmakers who supported the ban say the casino exemption 
was essential to overcome opposition from the powerful casino indus-
try and its allies in the Legislature’s South Jersey delegation.”82  State 
Senator Joe Vitale, chairman of the Senate’s health committee, stated 
that “[i]n a perfect world, the casino floors would be included, but 
[the state Senate and Assembly] just don’t have the votes.”83  Like-
wise, Assemblyman Richard Merkt criticized the exception, character-
izing it as a concession to “big business” while “small business” re-
ceived “the back of the hand.”84
 79 See, e.g., Editorial, Going Smokeless, but Not Far Enough, Ban Should One Day In-
clude Casinos, HERALD NEWS (Passaic County, N.J.), Apr. 14, 2006, at B11 (saying that 
the ban should be extended to include casinos as a matter of universal health). 
 80 See, e.g., Grzyboski, supra note 70, at 1G (smoker characterizing the ban as par-
ticularly unfair considering the exemption of casinos); Holl, supra note 73, at 6 (At-
lantic City pub owner explaining that the closer a bar is to a casino, the more nega-
tive the effect on that bar’s business the ban will be). 
 81 Pearsall, supra note 73, at 1G. 
 82 Holl, supra note 73, at 6; see also Kaitlin Gurney, N.J. Ban on Indoor Smoking 
Passes, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jan. 10, 2006, at A1 [hereinafter Gurney, N.J. Ban] 
(describing lawmakers who regretted the casino exemption as conceding that the bill 
would not have passed without the exemption); Elisa Ung, Smoking Ban Advances to a 
Final Vote, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jan. 6, 2006, at B01 (describing an assembly-
woman who sponsored the bill as regretting that the exemption of casinos was neces-
sary). 
 83 Kaitlin Gurney, Odds Against Atlantic City, N.J., Casino Smoking Ban, 
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Dec. 4, 2005, at B01 [hereinafter Gurney, Odds Against A.C.]. 
 84 Gurney, N.J. Ban, supra note 82, at A1.  The New Jersey Legislature did not re-
lease any hearing transcripts, debate transcripts, or witness testimony on the New Jer-
sey Smoke-Free Air Act, making a more thorough determination of the justification 
of the casino exemption difficult. See New Jersey Legislature—Bills, http://www.njleg 
.state.nj.us/bills/BillView.asp (select “2004–2005” for “Legislative Session” under 
“Bill Search”; then search for “S1926”; then follow “S1926” hyperlink) (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2007) (containing links to the documents on file with the New Jersey State 
Library that comprise the legislative history of the Smoke-Free Air Act).  The legisla-
tive history for the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act on file with the New Jersey State 
Library contains only the following: the bill as first introduced in the Senate, along 
with the sponsor’s statement; a subsequent reprint of the bill before the Senate; the 
Senate Health, Human Services, and Senior Citizens Committee statement on the 
bill to the Senate; the statement of the bill to the Senate with Senate floor amend-
ments; a subsequent reprint of the bill before the Senate; the Assembly Health and 
Human Services Committee statement on the bill to the Senate; the legislative fiscal 
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The New Jersey Casino Association, which lobbied vigorously 
against a smoking ban in casinos, commissioned a study that found 
that a Delaware smoking ban had a negative economic effect on the 
majority of racetracks equipped with slot machines in that state.85  
From this finding, which critics of the study dubbed “misleading,”86 
the study concluded that a smoking ban in New Jersey casinos would 
drive gamblers to other states and cost casino employees their jobs.87  
State Senator John Adler, who sponsored the legislation that would 
become the New Jersey ban, noted this study in observing that “[t]he 
state is allowed to draw rational distinctions about what it regulates 
and why it regulates it.”88  This line of reasoning—that the casino ex-
emption constitutes a legitimate effort to protect the economic inter-
est and vitality of the casinos—has been found by at least one federal 
district court outside of New Jersey to be sufficient to justify a casino 
exemption to a smoking ban similar to that in New Jersey. 89
II. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE SMOKING BANS 
This Comment focuses on whether the New Jersey Smoke-Free 
Air Act’s exception of casinos comports with the New Jersey Constitu-
tion.  However, it is appropriate to examine briefly several federal 
constitutional challenges that have arisen against similar smoking 
bans and the exceptions therein for two reasons.  First, at the risk of 
stating the obvious, any federal constitutional objection to another 
state’s smoking ban, assuming sufficient similarity between that ban 
and New Jersey’s ban, will be equally applicable in New Jersey.  Sec-
ond, and more germane to the focus of this Comment, New Jersey’s 
special law analysis at least resembles,90 and in some instances mir-
estimate; the bill as first introduced in the Assembly, along with the sponsor’s state-
ment; a subsequent reprint of the bill before the Assembly; and the Assembly Health 
and Human Services Committee statement on the bill to the Assembly.  Id.  The sub-
stance of these documents is essentially limited to the language of the bill in several 
of its incarnations.  Id. 
 85 Gurney, Odds Against A.C., supra note 83, at B01. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Kaitlin Gurney, Group Sues over Casino Exemption, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Mar. 
8, 2006, at B01 [hereinafter Gurney, Group Sues]; see also Gurney, N.J. Ban, supra note 
82, at A1 (citing Adler’s mention of the New Jersey Casino Association study). 
 89 See Coal. for Equal Rights, Inc. v. Owens, No. 06-CV-01145, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 42723, at *17 (D. Colo. June 23, 2006). 
 90 See, e.g., Paul Kimball Hosp., Inc. v. Brick Twp. Hosp., Inc., 432 A.2d 36, 45 
(N.J. 1981) (stating that “[a]n analysis similar to that used in the equal protection 
model has traditionally been applied to determine if legislation is proscribed as spe-
cial”). 
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rors,91 a federal constitutional equal protection analysis, one of the 
primary grounds upon which smoking bans and their exceptions 
have been challenged.92
A. Substantive Due Process 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
states, in pertinent part, that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”93  In Washing-
ton v. Glucksberg,94 the Supreme Court of the United States explained 
that “[t]he Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, 
and the ‘liberty’ it protects includes more than the absence of physi-
cal restraint. . . . The Clause also provides heightened protection 
against government interference with certain fundamental rights and 
liberty interests.”95  Opponents of the smoking ban have argued that 
the imposition of a blanket prohibition of smoking in indoor areas 
denies smokers such a fundamental right under the Constitution, 
that being the right to smoke.96
Glucksberg, however, also expressed the Court’s traditional reluc-
tance to expand the field of fundamental rights under the umbrella 
of substantive Due Process.97  To balance the Constitution’s protec-
tion of fundamental rights with this reluctance to so categorize as-
serted rights, federal courts subject the asserted right to a two-part 
test.98  The asserted right must be defined precisely99 and then be de-
termined as “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”100 to 
be deemed a fundamental right.101
 91 See, e.g., Robson v. Rodriquez, 141 A.2d 1, 6 (N.J. 1958) (explaining that “[t]he 
test of whether a law constitutes special legislation is essentially the same as that 
which determines whether it affords equal protection of the laws”). 
 92 See infra notes 158–63 and accompanying text. 
 93 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 94 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 95 Id. at 719 (citation omitted). 
 96 See, e.g., Thiel v. Nelson, 422 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1028 (D. Wis. 2006) (involving a 
plaintiff who asserted a fundamental right to smoke in a mental institution); New 
York City C.L.A.S.H. v. City of New York, 315 F. Supp. 2d 461, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(describing a lobbying group formed to promote the interests of smokers that at-
tacked smoking ban as a violation of a fundamental right to smoke under substantive 
Due Process). 
 97 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720. 
 98 Id. at 720–21. 
 99 Id. at 721; see also  Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. 
Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277–78 (1990). 
 100 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). 
 101 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21. 
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Under the Glucksberg analysis, the various indoor smoking bans 
clearly fail to violate any fundamental right.  Defined precisely, the 
right asserted is not the right to smoke, but rather the right to smoke 
in indoor public areas.102  Such a right does not carry the unequivocal 
support of American tradition and history.103  Quite the contrary, op-
position to tobacco use in its variety of forms, and particularly such 
use in public and indoor areas, dates back to American colonial 
times.104
Federal courts have been unanimous in their rejection of sub-
stantive due process challenges to indoor smoking restrictions.  In 
New York City C.L.A.S.H. v. City of New York,105 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York expressly stated that 
smoking bans do not interfere with any fundamental right.106  Like-
wise, in Thiel v. Nelson, the United States District Court for the District 
of Wisconsin also declared that “smoking is not a liberty interest pro-
tected by the due process clause.”107  Such a federal challenge would 
fair no better in New Jersey. 108
 102 None of the statewide indoor smoking bans purports to restrict smoking by in-
dividuals in their private residences.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-14-205 (2006) 
(expressly excluding private residences from the reach of the smoking ban); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1542 (2005) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-59 (West 2006) 
(same). 
 103 See generally supra notes 29, 40–62 and accompanying text. 
 104 Id. 
 105 315 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  As discussed earlier, the substantive due 
process challenge to the New York Smoking Ban contained therein was just one of 
many challenges to the ban, including those based on Equal Protection, the Right to 
Travel, procedural Due Process, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the First 
Amendment.  See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 106 New York City C.L.A.S.H., 315 F. Supp. 2d at 482. 
 107 422 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1030 (D. Wis. 2006); see also Gasper v. La. Stadium & Ex-
position Dist., 577 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that there is no fundamental 
right to prevent smoking in public places, but also recognizing that there is no fun-
damental right to smoke in public places). 
 108 An alternative substantive due process challenge mounted in Colorado, a state 
similar to New Jersey in its broad ban of indoor smoking and exemption of casinos, 
asserted that the fundamental right violated was the right of establishments to allow 
smoking on their premises.  Coal. for Equal Rights, Inc. v. Owens, No. 06-CV-01145, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42723, at *23–24 (D. Colo. June 23, 2006).  This challenge met 
the same fate as prior due process challenges, with the court stating, “[t]he notion 
that the right to allow smoking in one’s bar or restaurant is a fundamental right, 
equivalent to the other rights the Supreme Court has deemed fundamental . . . is to 
say the least, far fetched.”  Id. at *24. 
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B. Regulatory Taking 
The Takings Clause, a part of the Fifth Amendment of the Fed-
eral Constitution, states that no “private property [shall] be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.”109  In interpreting this lan-
guage, the Supreme Court has extended the Takings Clause beyond 
physical appropriation or occupation of property, holding that “a 
state statute that substantially furthers important public policies may 
so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a 
‘taking.’”110  Alternatively, or perhaps as an extension of this prior 
holding, the Court has declared that “when the owner of real prop-
erty has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses 
in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property eco-
nomically idle, he has suffered a taking.”111  While these standards al-
low for highly subjective and consequently varying interpretations,112 
these general formulations of the regulatory takings analysis suffice 
for the purpose of a brief evaluation of state indoor smoking prohibi-
tions. 
Opponents of smoking regulations argue, in this context, that 
the bans deprive bar and restaurant owners of economically benefi-
cial use of their respective properties, or at least that the regulations 
frustrate the expectations the owners held upon investing in the 
property.113  However, while the ever-evolving nature of takings analy-
sis may render it a fertile field for federal challenges to state smoking 
bans,114 it appears that one critical obstacle will hamper such chal-
lenges.  Research on the effects of the bans on bar and restaurant 
revenue has come to no consensus that these prohibitions “frustrate 
 109 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 110 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978). 
 111 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). 
 112 See Douglas W. Kmiec, Institute of Bill of Rights Law Symposium Defining Takings: 
Private Property and the Future of Government Regulation: Inserting the Last Remaining 
Pieces into the Takings Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 995 (1997) (characterizing 
takings jurisprudence in general as a “1000-piece puzzle[]” and regulatory takings as 
an “ill-fitting piece[] left over from other puzzles long ago forgotten”). 
 113 See, e.g., D.A.B.E., Inc. v. City of Toledo, 393 F.3d 692, 695 (6th Cir. 2005) (de-
nying claims by plaintiff group of bar, restaurant, and bowling alley owners that an 
ordinance requiring the construction of separate smoking areas denied the plaintiffs 
economically viable use of their establishments). 
 114 See, e.g., Robert P. Hagan, Comment, Restaurants, Bars and Workplaces, Lend Me 
Your Air: Smokefree Laws as Private Property Exactions—The Undiscovered Country for Nol-
lan and Dolan?, 22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 143, 149–50 (2005) (suggesting 
that the outcome of a Takings Clause challenge to state smoking bans is largely de-
pendent upon how the argument is framed and, consequently, the standard that the 
court applies). 
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distinct investment-backed expectations,”115 much less deprive restau-
rants or bars of “all economically beneficial uses,”116 despite the dire 
contrary predictions of smoking ban opponents. 117  Considering the 
substantial presumption of validity of regulations passed under state 
police powers and attacked as regulatory takings,118 it seems unlikely 
that the inconclusive research on the denial by smoking regulations 
of economically beneficial uses of property could support a takings 
challenge.119
In D.A.B.E., Inc. v. City of Toledo,120 a group of bar, restaurant, and 
bowling alley owners challenged a city ordinance requiring that their 
establishments provide separate smoking lounges for their smoking 
customers on the ground that the ordinance amounted to a regula-
tory taking under the Federal Constitution.121  On appeal, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that even if these 
establishments lost customers due to the regulation, this mere drop 
in customers would not be sufficient to demonstrate the denial of 
economically viable use of land necessary to render a regulation a 
taking.122  While the Toledo regulation differs substantially from the 
New Jersey ban and other state bans discussed herein, the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s reasoning that more than a mere drop in business is necessary 
to demonstrate a regulatory taking, particularly considering the in-
conclusive evidence on whether there is in fact any such drop caused 
by indoor smoking bans, would likely be applicable as a significant 
obstacle in a federal123 challenge to these state bans.124
 115 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 127. 
 116 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019. 
 117 See, e.g., O’Reiley, supra note 75 (stating that “[p]ublished studies come to 
widely differing conclusions [regarding the effects of smoking bans on the business 
of bars and restaurants], largely reflecting the views of the groups that commissioned 
them,” and describing the results of several such studies). 
 118 See Kmiec, supra note 112, at 995 (describing the presumption of validity as 
“virtually insurmountable”). 
 119 But see Hagan, supra note 114, at 149–50 (suggesting that a takings challenge to 
these bans could be successful if framed as an exaction analysis, thus requiring a less 
deferential judicial standard).  This analysis is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 120 393 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 121 Id. at 694. 
 122 Id. at 695. 
 123 This Comment takes no position on the potential for success of a state regula-
tory taking challenge to the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act beyond noting that the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey has characterized New Jersey constitutional takings ju-
risprudence as “in general conformity” with federal constitutional principles.  Gard-
ner v. N.J. Pinelands Comm., 593 A.2d 251, 257 (N.J. 1991). 
 124 D.A.B.E., Inc., 393 F.3d at 695.  The court also recited language used by the 
Supreme Court that would work against a takings challenge to state smoking bans.  It 
said that “[e]ven if the ordinance ‘prevent[ed] the most profitable use of [appel-
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C. Equal Protection 
Another federal constitutional ground upon which state smok-
ing bans have been challenged, and one highly relevant to potential 
attacks to New Jersey’s ban on state constitutional grounds,125 stems 
from the Fourteenth Amendment, which states in pertinent part that 
“[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person126 within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”127  The Supreme Court attempts to bal-
ance this principle with the reality that most legislation classifies indi-
viduals for separate treatment by requiring that, when “a law neither 
burdens a fundamental right128 nor targets a suspect class . . . [, a leg-
islative classification need only] bear[] a rational relation to some  
legitimate end” to comport with the Equal Protection Clause.129   
Under this analysis, the legitimate end need not be the actual pur-
pose of the legislation, but rather any conceivable legitimate end.130  
Classifications deemed suspect and thus subjected to a higher stan-
dard of scrutiny are generally limited to those that distinguish based 
on race, alienage, national origin,131 or gender.132
Proponents and opponents of indoor smoking bans argue that 
the exceptions that the bans generally provide for, such as the casino 
exception in New Jersey, arbitrarily classify and discriminate in favor 
of those entities to which the exceptions are granted—that is, that 
these classifications are not rationally related to any legitimate pur-
lants’] property,’ that would not be enough to establish a taking,” and that “lost prof-
its ‘unaccompanied by any physical property restriction—provides a slender reed 
upon which to rest a takings claim.’”  Id. at 696 n.1 (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 
U.S. 51, 65–66 (1979)). 
 125 See infra notes 158–63 and accompanying text.  
 126 “Person” as used in the Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted to in-
clude more than individuals and would apply to enterprises challenging state smok-
ing bans. See, e.g., Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) 
(interrupting counsel to halt argument on whether “person,” as used in the Four-
teenth Amendment, encompasses corporations, and holding that it does). 
 127 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 128 As already discussed, the state smoking bans involve no fundamental right. See 
supra notes 102–08 and accompanying text. 
 129 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). 
 130 U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980). 
 131 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
 132 The Supreme Court expressly refused to equate “gender classifications, for all 
purposes, to classifications based on race or national origin” as subject to the highest 
equal protection scrutiny.  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996).  None-
theless, the Court held that “[p]arties who seek to defend gender-based government 
action must demonstrate an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for that action.”  Id. 
at 531. 
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pose.133  They contend that while the prohibition may promote a  
legitimate end—that of improved public health—the exception for 
certain indoor public areas in no way promotes such an end.134  On its 
face, this argument seems self-evident; exceptions that allow contin-
ued smoking and the production of secondhand smoke in indoor ar-
eas could not be rationally related to the goal of promoting public 
health, as the exceptions do just the opposite.135
These equal protection arguments against smoking bans, how-
ever, fail to fully appreciate the deferential standard applied to classi-
fications not involving a suspect class.136  While the exceptions to the 
indoor smoking bans may not promote public health, classifications 
analyzed by the courts under a rational relationship test need not be 
rationally related to the stated, primary, or actual purpose of the leg-
islation, but rather need only be rationally related to any plausible 
purpose.137  Thus, in Coalition for Equal Rights, Inc. v. Owens,138 the 
court found a plausible purpose of the Colorado indoor smoking 
ban’s exemption of state casinos to be the economic protection of 
those casinos against the less regulated Native American casino com-
petitors.139  An exemption from the smoking ban, the court held, was 
rationally related to that end.140  Likewise, a Connecticut court found 
the exception of Native American-run casinos141 from the state’s  
indoor smoking ban to be rationally related to concerns over the 
state’s ability to enforce such a ban on Native American land, again a 
legitimate end, even if not the actual purpose of the legislation as a 
 133 See, e.g., Coal. for Equal Rights, Inc. v. Owens, No. 06-CV-01145 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 42723 (D. Colo. June 23, 2006); Batte-Holmgren v. Galvin, No. CV044000287, 
2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3313 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 5, 2004); O’Reiley, supra note 
75 (characterizing the exception as solely the result of favoritism of a powerful lobby-
ing group). 
 134 Coal. for Equal Rights, Inc., No. 06-CV-01145, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42723, at 
*15. 
 135 Accord Editorial, supra note 79, at B11 (claiming that by excluding casinos, the 
New Jersey smoking ban does not go far enough in the protection of public health). 
 136 See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (“[A] classification neither involv-
ing fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong pre-
sumption of validity.”); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (“[T]his 
Court consistently defers to legislative determinations as to the desirability of particu-
lar statutory discriminations.”). 
 137 U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980). 
 138 No. 06-CV-01145, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42723 (D. Colo. June 23, 2006). 
 139 Id. at *17. 
 140 Id. 
 141 The conceivable legitimate purpose argument in this case would not be di-
rectly on point in New Jersey because New Jersey casinos are not on sovereign Native 
American lands. 
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whole or the exception.142  Because at least one of these conceivable 
legitimate ends could similarly justify New Jersey’s exception of casi-
nos from its indoor smoking ban, a federal143 equal protection chal-
lenge to the New Jersey ban would likely fail. 
In fact, shortly before the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act took 
effect, the New Jersey Hospitality Industry for Fairness Coalition chal-
lenged the statute on equal protection grounds.144  United States Dis-
trict Judge Chesler, in an unpublished ruling, held that a future law-
suit on such grounds would not succeed, and thus the state should 
not be enjoined from passing the law.145
III. NEW JERSEY SPECIAL LAW ANALYSIS 
A. New Jersey Constitutional Treatment of Special Laws 
The New Jersey Constitution states that “[n]o general law shall 
embrace any provision of a private, special or local character.”146  This 
general prohibition of private, special, or local147 laws does not, how-
ever, completely preclude the possibility of such laws; the state consti-
 142 Batte-Holmgren v. Galvin, No. CV044000287, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3313, 
at *13–14 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 5, 2004); see also Castaways Backwater Cafe, Inc. v. 
Marstiller, No. 2:05-cv-273-FtM-29SPC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60317 (D. Fla. Aug. 25, 
2006) (finding that the Florida indoor smoking ban that excepted, among other  
areas, stand-alone bars, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, as the economic 
considerations that supported the exception satisfied a rational relationship  
analysis). 
 143 New Jersey’s Constitution has been interpreted as containing an implicit Equal 
Protection Clause.  Sojourner A. v. N.J. Dep’t of Human Servs., 828 A.2d 306, 314 
(N.J. 2003).  Equal protection attacks on legislation under the New Jersey Constitu-
tion are not analyzed using the rational relationship test but rather a balancing ap-
proach that allows the courts “to examine each claim on a continuum that reflects 
the nature of the burdened right and the importance of the governmental restric-
tion.”  Id. at 315.  While the federal and New Jersey tests weigh the same factors and 
often produce the same result, id., the Supreme Court of New Jersey expressly de-
clared that state equal protection principles provide New Jersey “citizens with greater 
rights . . . than those available under the United States Constitution.”  Lewis v. Harris, 
908 A.2d 196, 220 (N.J. 2006).  Whether the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act would 
survive state equal protection scrutiny is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 144 Grzyboski, supra note 70, at 1G. 
 145 See id. 
 146 N.J. CONST., art. IV, § 7, ¶ 7. 
 147 Because private, special, and local have been interpreted as synonymous in the 
context of these constitutional provisions, this Comment will hereinafter refer to 
such laws simply as “special.” 
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tution includes a process by which the legislature may pass such legis-
lation.148
In Vreeland v. Byrne,149 the Supreme Court of New Jersey de-
scribed why many states have implemented general prohibitions of 
special laws: 
The legislative and judicial processes [have] developed along dif-
ferent lines . . . the legislative process lacks the safeguards of due 
process and the tradition of impartiality which restrain the courts 
from using their powers to dispense special favors. Over the 
course of time, as a result, the propensities of legislatures to in-
dulge in favoritism through special legislation developed into a 
major abuse of governmental power. 
     As the bulk of special laws grew, demands for reform became 
insistent, and constitutional prohibitions were enacted to limit the 
practice of enacting special legislation and to achieve greater uni-
versality and uniformity in the operation of statute law in respect 
to all persons.150
Thus, as the Vreeland court described, special law prohibitions, both 
in New Jersey and elsewhere, developed as a control on the tendency 
of legislatures to engage in favoritism and partiality, a tendency that 
would manifest itself in legislation passed for the benefit of particular 
groups.151
The New Jersey Constitution, except for the use of special as syn-
onymous with private or local, does not define “special law,” nor does 
it set any line between special and general laws.152  However, New Jer-
sey courts have been relatively consistent in their definition and 
analysis of special laws.  In 1878,153 the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
defined special laws as follows in State ex rel. Van Riper v. Parsons:154
[S]pecial laws are all those that rest on a false or deficient classifi-
cation; their vice is that they do not embrace all the class to which 
they are naturally related; they create preference and establish 
inequalities; they apply to persons, things or places possessed of 
certain qualities or situations, and exclude from their effect other 
 148 N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 8.  The New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act was not passed 
pursuant to this process.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-55 to -64 (West 2006). 
 149 370 A.2d 825 (N.J. 1977). 
 150 Id. at 828 (quoting 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 40.01 (4th ed. 
1973)). 
 151 Id. 
 152 See N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, ¶¶ 7, 8. 
 153 New Jersey first precluded special laws governing certain subjects in 1875, and 
this prohibition passed with little change into the new state constitution in 1947.  
Vreeland, 370 A.2d at 828. 
 154 40 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1878). 
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persons, things or places which are not dissimilar in these re-
spects.155
While the definition and analysis have been formulated differ-
ently over the years, the substance of the State ex rel. Van Riper formu-
lation remains essentially intact in New Jersey special law analysis.156  
State ex rel. Budd v. Hancock157 further developed the State ex rel. Van 
Riper rule and sharpened the focus of the analysis on those parties 
excluded by a legislative classification, finding a law to be special 
when “by force of an inherent limitation, it arbitrarily separates some 
persons, places or things from others upon which, but for such limi-
tation, it would operate. The test of a special law is the appropriate-
ness of its provisions to the objects that it excludes.”158
More recent formulations of the special law analysis have mir-
rored these prior cases.  The most oft-cited case on New Jersey special 
law refers to both State ex rel. Van Riper and State ex rel. Budd in stating: 
In deciding whether an act is general or special, it is what is ex-
cluded that is the determining factor and not what is included.  If 
no one is excluded who should be encompassed, the law is gen-
eral. Another requirement of a general law is that it must affect 
equally all of a group who, bearing in mind the purposes of the 
legislation, are distinguished by characteristics sufficiently marked 
and important to make them a class by themselves.159
Vreeland v. Byrne160 likewise translated the early formulations into 
a method of special law analysis, with the first step being to “discern 
the purpose and object of the enactment,” the second being “to apply 
it to the factual situation presented,” before finally deciding 
“whether, as so applied, the resulting classification can be said to rest 
upon any rational or reasonable basis relevant to the purpose and ob-
ject of the act.”161
Comparisons between special law analysis and federal equal pro-
tection analysis naturally arise because both are concerned with clas-
 155 Id. at 9. 
 156 See Paul Kimball Hosp., Inc. v. Brick Twp. Hosp., Inc., 432 A.2d 36, 44–45 (N.J. 
1981) (listing several formulations of the special law analysis, one of which cited State 
ex rel. Van Riper as support for its formulation). 
 157 48 A. 1023 (N.J. 1901). 
 158 Id. at 1024. 
 159 Harvey v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 153 A.2d 10, 14 (N.J. 1959) (citations 
omitted). 
 160 370 A.2d 825 (N.J. 1977). 
 161 Id. at 829.  See also Mahwah v. Bergen County Bd. of Taxation, 486 A.2d 818, 
826 (N.J. 1985) (applying Vreeland three-part test); Newark Superior Officers Ass’n v. 
Newark, 486 A.2d 305, 311–12 (N.J. 1985) (same). 
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sifications before the law.  In fact, several New Jersey special law cases 
have equated the special law standard to an equal protection rational 
relationship standard, which legislation satisfies if it “bears a rational 
relation to some162 legitimate end.”163  For instance, in Robson v. 
Rodriquez,164 the Supreme Court of New Jersey expressly declared that 
“[t]he test of whether a law constitutes special legislation is essentially 
the same as that which determines whether it affords equal protec-
tion of the laws.”165  Likewise, while Paul Kimball Hospital, Inc. v. Brick 
Township Hospital, Inc.166 toned down the language of Robson in refer-
ring to the tests as “similar” rather than “essentially the same,” the 
opinion shortly thereafter employed principles common to the equal 
protection analysis, including that “an adequate factual basis for the 
legislative judgment [to create a particular classification] is presumed 
to exist” and that such legislative distinctions are strongly presumed 
to be constitutional.167
However, several of the aforementioned formulations of the 
special law analysis suggest a critical distinction from an equal protec-
tion rational relationship analysis.  For instance, in Vreeland, the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey required as the first step in the special law 
analysis that “the purpose and object of the enactment,” rather than 
any conceivable purpose, be discerned to determine if the classifica-
tion in question rested upon a rational relationship to that purpose 
and object.168  Even Paul Kimball Hospital, notwithstanding its allusion 
to the similarity of the equal protection and special law analyses and 
use of principles traditionally employed as part of the equal protec-
tion analysis, found the legislative classification at issue valid because 
 162 As aforementioned, the legitimate end need not be the actual or primary pur-
pose of the legislation, but rather any conceivable purpose.  U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. 
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980). 
 163 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). 
 164 141 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1958). 
 165 Id. at 6. 
 166 432 A.2d 36 (N.J. 1981). 
 167 Id. at 45; see also Phillips v. Curiale, 608 A.2d 895, 905 (N.J. 1992) (quoting 
Robson and reasoning that plaintiff’s assertion that the statute in question denied him 
Equal Protection constituted a special law challenge); Mahwah v. Bergen County Bd. 
of Taxation, 486 A.2d 818, 827 (N.J. 1985) (quoting Robson and holding that, as in an 
equal protection rational relationship analysis, legislation containing a classification 
will be held valid if any conceivable basis justifies the classification); Harvey v. Bd. of 
Chosen Freeholders, 153 A.2d 10, 15 (N.J. 1959) (stating that a legislative classifica-
tion is “presumed to rest upon a rational basis” in a special law analysis if any con-
ceivable set of facts supports the classification). 
 168 Vreeland v. Byrne, 370 A.2d 825, 829 (N.J. 1977). 
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it bore a rational relationship to “the purpose and object of the [leg-
islation],” rather than merely any conceivable purpose.169
Admittedly, the difference between an analysis requiring a classi-
fication to bear a rational relationship to any conceivable purpose, a 
hallmark of the traditional rational relationship test, and one requir-
ing a rational relationship to the stated, primary, or apparent pur-
pose of a statute is a subtle one.170  If the outcomes of New Jersey Su-
preme Court special law cases uniformly signaled that the traditional 
rational relationship test was being applied to determine the validity 
of a particular classification, then the subtle departures described in 
the previous paragraph from the equal protection model could easily 
be dismissed as insignificant linguistic imprecision, not reflective of 
the overarching holdings of the particular cases.171  However, the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey has found classifications that would seem 
to meet a traditional rational relationship standard as invalid special 
laws,172 inviting the suggestion that the special law standard is more 
demanding.  As will be discussed,173 the clarification of this grey area 
of New Jersey special law jurisprudence—whether a classification 
need be related to an actual purpose of a statute, or merely any con-
ceivable purpose—is a critical one, as the determination will likely 
prove dispositive in the special law analysis of the New Jersey Smoke-
Free Air Act.174
B. Representative Cases 
A look at several New Jersey special law cases demonstrates both 
the lack of uniformity with which the court has applied the purpose 
aspect175 of the special law analysis and the consequences of one for-
mulation as opposed to the other.  In Harvey v. Board of Chosen Free-
holders,176 for example, the Supreme Court of New Jersey not only de-
 169 Paul Kimball Hospital, Inc., 432 A.2d at 46. 
 170 See supra notes 156–69 and accompanying text. 
 171 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 207 n.3 (1992) (White, J., dissent-
ing) (finding quotations from older cases alluded to by the majority to be mere 
“window dressing” in light of the many recent cases on the disputed issue that made 
no reference to the subject of these selective quotations). 
 172 See, e.g., Town of Secaucus v. Hudson County Bd. of Taxation, 628 A.2d 288 
(N.J. 1993) (see infra notes 197–210 and accompanying text for a more thorough dis-
cussion of this case); Vreeland, 370 A.2d 825. 
 173 See infra notes 238–85 and accompanying text. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Purpose aspect is the term this Comment will use to refer to whether the classifi-
cation need bear a rational relationship to any conceivable purpose, or to the actual 
or apparent purpose. 
 176 153 A.2d 10 (N.J. 1959). 
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scribed the special law analysis in a manner nearly identical to a tradi-
tional rational relationship analysis, but clearly considered any con-
ceivable purpose for the allegedly special legislation.177  In Harvey, a 
supplement to a state pension statute provided that county freehold-
ers could require any court attendant in the office of the sheriff who 
had served over twenty years and who was over sixty-five years of age 
to retire, provided that the attendant was a member of the state em-
ployee retirement system.178  A court attendant forced to retire under 
the statute claimed that the exemption of employees not in the state 
retirement system rendered the statute an invalid special law.179
As previously discussed,180 the oft-cited formulation of the special 
law analysis in Harvey focused on what is excluded from the purview 
of the legislation by the classification, and whether the law affects 
“equally all of a group who, bearing in mind the purposes of the leg-
islation, are distinguished by characteristics sufficiently marked and 
important to make them a class by themselves.”181  The opinion later 
clarified that the “purposes of the legislation” contemplated in the 
analysis are not limited to the legislature’s stated or actual purposes, 
but rather “any conceivable state of facts which would afford reason-
able support” for the classification.182  Applying such a standard, the 
court held the classification to be valid, finding it conceivable, al-
though not stated on the record, that “the legislature decided to ex-
clude from retirement those over 65 and not members of the retire-
ment system because the non-members would have no pension upon 
which to rely.”183  This classification, according to the court, was thus 
reasonably based on a balancing between the “financial ability to care 
for oneself and a policy judgment as to the desirability of limiting 
those over 65 in this type of hazardous work.”184
Vreeland v. Byrne,185 decided eighteen years later in a four-to-three 
decision, seemed to stray from the strict parallel between special law 
and equal protection analysis presented by Harvey.  The challenged 
statute in Vreeland increased the salary of associate justices of the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey but denied that increase to any present 
member of the state senate or general assembly that was thereafter 
 177 Id. at 15. 
 178 Id. at 13. 
 179 Id. 
 180 See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 181 Harvey, 153 A.2d at 14 (citations omitted). 
 182 Id. at 15. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. 
 185 370 A.2d 825 (N.J. 1977). 
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appointed to the bench.186  When the governor nominated a member 
of the state senate to the court and the state senate confirmed the 
nomination, the validity of the statute took center stage.187
The Vreeland court applied a three-step approach to the special 
law analysis, determining first “the purpose and object of the enact-
ment,” then applying this determination to the facts presented, and 
finally deciding “whether as so applied, the resulting classification can 
be said to rest upon any rational or reasonable basis relevant to the 
purpose and object of the act.”188  The court determined the purpose 
of the statute to be solely to adjust judicial salaries.189  Under the facts 
of the case, the statute would result in one justice, distinguished from 
the other justices only in that he had been a state senator at the time 
of the statute’s passage, receiving a lower salary than the other jus-
tices.190  This classification, the court concluded, did not rest upon a 
rational basis relevant to the aforementioned purpose, thus render-
ing the questioned statute unconstitutionally special.191
The dissent in Vreeland, apparently recognizing the divergence of 
the majority’s application of the special law analysis from prior analy-
ses more closely adhering to the traditional rational relationship 
model, identified a clearly “conceivable state of facts which would 
suggest a rational reason for the statutory exemption.”192  Conceiva-
bly, the dissent argued, the legislators that included the exception 
may well have wished to avoid the personal bias that the statute could 
have invoked if the judicial salary increases were made applicable to 
 186 Id. at 827. 
 187 Id. at 826–27.  The special law provision at issue was not the broad prohibition 
of special laws absent a particular manner of public notification, but rather the abso-
lute prohibition of special laws increasing or decreasing the term or tenure rights of 
public employees.  Id. at 827.  Additionally, the case was far more complicated than 
the typical special law challenge.  See id. at 826–27.  A group of taxpayer groups and 
state senators challenged the nomination, stating that it contravened a provision of 
the New Jersey Constitution that prohibited members of the state senate from being 
nominated during their term for any state civil office or position.  Id. at 827.  Both 
sides conceded that, were the state statute containing the judicial salary increase 
found to be unconstitutional as special legislation, the appointment would violate 
the state constitution in the manner argued by the plaintiffs.  Id, at 827.  Thus, while 
the judicial nominee would seem to be the party adversely affected by allegedly spe-
cial legislation denying him a salary increase, he was among the parties defending 
the state statute as general legislation, as a contrary finding would render his nomi-
nation void.  Id. 
 188 Id. at 829. 
 189 Id. at 828. 
 190 Id. at 829. 
 191 Vreeland, 370 A.2d at 829. 
 192 Id. at 850 (Pashman, J., dissenting). 
SAMSON_FINAL_V2 1/11/2008  2:10:37 PM 
2008] COMMENT 383 
 
legislators that later took the bench.193  The classification barring 
those that voted on the salary increase from taking part in the in-
crease would clearly have borne a rational relationship to this con-
ceivable purpose, the dissent contended, as the classification elimi-
nated the possibility that personal bias directed the legislators’ 
votes.194  Thus, the dissent concluded, the law did not violate the pro-
hibition of special laws.195  Nonetheless, the majority rejected the ar-
gument concerning this conceivable purpose, instead focusing on the 
stated purpose of mere adjustment to judicial salaries and concluding 
that the distinction bore no rational relationship to this purpose.196  
The apparent split of the court in this case, on whether the classifica-
tion need bear some rational relationship to the actual purpose of 
the legislation or merely to any conceivable purpose, accurately 
represents the divergent paths special law cases have taken at times in 
New Jersey. 
The most recent New Jersey special law case also saw the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey split on its functional, if not nominal, ad-
herence to a traditional rational relationship analysis in determining 
the reasonableness of the challenged classification.197  In Town of Se-
caucus v. Hudson County Board of Taxation, the court considered a state 
law that exempted cities operating vocational programs for over 
twenty years in counties of certain population sizes and densities from 
payment of taxes toward county vocational schools.198  Although the 
statute did not state so expressly, it effectively applied only to 
Bayonne,199 allowing the city to pay a lower county tax rate due to its 
satisfaction of these requirements.200
The majority in Town of Secaucus, citing several special law cases 
including Vreeland, recited a special law analysis formula in line with a 
traditional equal protection rational relationship analysis.201  Quoting 
Budd,202 the court declared that a law is special “when, by force of an 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. at 850. 
 195 Id. at 851. 
 196 Id. at 829 (majority opinion). 
 197 Town of Secaucus v. Hudson County Bd. of Taxation, 628 A.2d 288 (N.J. 
1993).  As in Vreeland, the special law provision at issue was an absolute prohibition, 
this one being the prohibition of special laws “[r]elating to taxation or exemption 
therefrom.”  Id. at 294 (quoting N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 9(6)). 
 198 Id. at 291. 
 199 A law is not necessarily special because it applies only to a class of one.  Paul 
Kimball Hosp., Inc. v. Brick Twp. Hosp., Inc., 432 A.2d 36, 46 (N.J. 1981). 
 200 Town of Secaucus, 628 A.2d at 290. 
 201 See id. at 294. 
 202 State ex rel. Budd v. Hancock, 48 A. 1023, 1024 (N.J. 1901). 
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inherent limitation, it arbitrarily separates some persons, places or 
things from others upon which, but for such limitation, it would op-
erate.”203  In determining whether the separation was arbitrary, the 
court stated that it need not limit its inquiry “to the stated purpose of 
the legislation, but should seek any conceivable rational basis” upon 
which the classification may rest.204  The court then discerned two 
conceivable legitimate purposes to the legislation—avoiding double 
taxation of municipalities with their own vocational schools and pro-
moting quality vocational schools in densely populated areas—but 
concluded its Vreeland analysis by holding that the exception of 
Bayonne bore no rational relationship to either of these two objec-
tives.205
As in Vreeland, the Town of Secaucus dissent argued that the ma-
jority failed to consider adequately any conceivable purpose in its ap-
plication of the special law analysis.206  The lines drawn by the excep-
tion, the dissent contended, represented a reasonable attempt to 
relieve residents of municipalities of a certain population size and 
density with established vocational programs of the obligation of pay-
ing for a county vocational program of which those residents would 
be unlikely to avail themselves.207  That the court did not find the 
boundaries of the classification reasonable was immaterial, the dis-
sent continued, as “courts should not substitute their judgment for 
that of the Legislature in determining whether a legislative classifica-
tion is rational.”208  In fact, the dissent emphasized, the majority ex-
pressly recognized at least a remote, and thus conceivable, possibility 
that the statute and exception related to the legislative purpose of 
promoting vocational programs in the most densely populated mu-
nicipalities.209  Because the conceivable purposes acknowledged by 
the majority formed a plausible basis for the contested exception, the 
dissent concluded, the majority erred in striking down the statute as 
an unconstitutional special law.210
One additional New Jersey trial court special law case warrants 
discussion in relation to the New Jersey indoor smoking prohibition, 
as the case concerns a statute that applies only to Atlantic City.  In 
 203 Town of Secaucus, 628 A.2d at 294. 
 204 Id. at 294–95. 
 205 Id. at 294–96. 
 206 Id. at 305 (Stein, J., dissenting). 
 207 Id. at 303. 
 208 Id. at 305. 
 209 Town of Secaucus, 628 A.2d at 305 (Stein, J., dissenting). 
 210 Id. 
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Parking Authority of Atlantic City v. Board of Chosen Freeholders,211 the 
plaintiff parking authority attacked as unconstitutional a state law 
that provided that: 
the “governing body of any county in which is located a munici-
pality in which casino gaming is authorized” may adopt an ordi-
nance or resolution creating a county transportation authority . . . 
. [The] county transportation authority shall have preemptive ju-
risdiction with respect to public transportation matters and shall 
be the exclusive instrumentality with responsibility for those ser-
vices.212
In effect, this statute allowed for the dissolution of the existing mu-
nicipal parking authority in Atlantic City,213 the plaintiff, and estab-
lished a new county public agency to carry out the same function.214  
Plaintiff parking authority asserted that the problems the legislature 
intended to solve with this statute, problems related to transporta-
tion, were not unique to Atlantic City, thus making the separate clas-
sification of Atlantic City for purposes of this statute arbitrary and in 
violation of the New Jersey Constitution.215
Atlantic City’s unique New Jersey constitutional status injected 
the special law analysis in Parking Authority of Atlantic City with a novel 
issue—the “determination as to when it is appropriate to specifically 
classify Atlantic County as a unique area, based upon collateral prob-
lems which may arise as the result of casino gaming.”216  The court 
observed that the statute did not address a concern that is “inherently 
related” to gambling; rather, the legislation took aim at a problem 
“only derivatively the result of the implementation of casino gaming 
in Atlantic City.”217  While the separate constitutional treatment of At-
lantic City in terms of gambling may serve as a tempting ground to 
justify other classifications, the court ruled that “the mere authoriza-
tion of casino gaming in Atlantic City does not in and of itself justify 
the legislative classification contained in the County Transportation 
Authorities Act.”218  In other words, laws classifying Atlantic City for 
separate treatment do not survive special law analysis for the mere 
 211 434 A.2d 676 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1981). 
 212 Id. at 679 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:35B-4, 6(a) (West 2006)). 
 213 “Absent an organic change in the New Jersey Constitution, it is impossible for 
any other county to avail itself of the authority provided by the act.”  Id. at 681. 
 214 Id. at 680. 
 215 Id. at 681–82. 
 216 Id. at 681. 
 217 Parking Auth. of Atlantic City, 434 A.2d at 682. 
 218 Id. 
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fact that Atlantic City is so classified in terms of gambling under the 
New Jersey Constitution.219
However, the court did not find Atlantic City’s unique constitu-
tional status immaterial to the special law determination.220  Rather, it 
held that where the legislature directs a statute at a collateral prob-
lem resulting from the municipality’s allowance of gambling, the 
statute’s separate treatment of Atlantic City is reasonable “if a direct 
nexus can be established between the advent of casino gaming and 
the collateral problem created thereby.”221  As far as the statute at is-
sue was concerned, the court found a sufficient nexus between the 
allowance of gambling in Atlantic City and the transportation prob-
lems posed by the resulting steady stream of visitors to justify separate 
classification of Atlantic City under the statute.222
No search for a conceivable purpose of the statutory classifica-
tion in Parking Authority of Atlantic City was necessary, as the court 
found the classification contained in the statute to be reasonably re-
lated to the stated purpose of the legislation, to relieve Atlantic City 
of its unique transportation problems.223  The opinion did recite the 
Harvey formulation of the special law analysis and noted, as virtually 
all special law cases do, the strong presumption of constitutionality 
for legislative classifications and the wide range of discretion the leg-
islature is afforded in making such classifications.224  However, the 
decision offered little overall insight regarding the purpose aspect of 
the special law analysis; the case’s value in terms of this Comment 
centers squarely on the court’s observations concerning the effect 
that Atlantic City’s unique constitutional treatment plays in a special 
law analysis.225
C. Current Special Law Analysis 
On one hand, the language of New Jersey special law analysis has 
remained relatively constant over the years.  When the Paul Kimball 
Hospital opinion quoted Van Riper in characterizing special laws as 
those that “create preference and establish inequalities[,] . . . apply to 
persons, things or places possessed of certain qualities or situations, 
and exclude from their effect other persons, things or places which 
 219 Id. 
 220 Id. at 684. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Parking Auth. of Atlantic City, 434 A.2d at 684. 
 224 Id. at 681. 
 225 Id. at 680–85. 
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are not dissimilar in these respects,”226 it cited a case over 100 years its 
elder.  Similarly, Town of Secaucus recited a ninety-year-old special law 
analysis formulation when it drew language from Budd.227  One might 
expect such continuity to create certainty as to the analysis employed 
in special law cases. 
On the other hand, the analysis in relatively recent special law 
cases has seemed to vary, if not in form, then in substance, as to the 
purpose aspect of the analysis.  This aspect is critical, as every formu-
lation of the analysis requires some determination of whether the 
disputed classification is reasonable in terms of a legislative pur-
pose.228  The most recent special law case, Town of Secaucus, used the 
three-step special law analytical formula from Vreeland and at least re-
cited that a court is not limited to the stated purpose of legislation 
but may consider any conceivable legitimate purpose in determining 
whether a classification is appropriate.229  As was the case in Vree-
land,230 however, the majority in Town of Secaucus seemed to be far 
more critical of the legitimacy of conceivable purposes to the chal-
lenged legislation than the court had been in earlier special law cases, 
which applied a standard nearly identical to the highly deferential 
equal protection rational relationship model. 231  Each of these cases 
appeared to require that something more than a conceivable legiti-
mate purpose serve as the basis for the challenged classification.232  
The passage of nearly fifteen years since Town of Secaucus without an-
other New Jersey Supreme Court special law decision has only further 
obscured any conception of how courts are to apply the purpose as-
pect of the special law analysis. 
 226 Paul Kimball Hosp., Inc. v. Brick Twp. Hosp., Inc., 432 A.2d 36, 44 (N.J. 1981) 
(quoting State ex rel. Van Riper v. Parsons, 40 N.J.L. 1, 9 (N.J. 1878)). 
 227 Town of Secaucus v. Hudson County Bd. of Taxation, 628 A.2d 288, 294 (N.J. 
1993) (quoting State ex rel. Budd v. Hancock, 48 A. 1023, 1024 (N.J. 1901)). 
 228 See Roe v. Kervick, 199 A.2d 834, 858 (N.J. 1964) (defining a law as general if it, 
among other things, “encompasses all of the subjects which reasonably belong within 
the classification”); Harvey v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 153 A.2d 10, 14 (N.J. 1959) 
(“Another requirement of a general law is that it must affect equally all of a group 
who, bearing in mind the purposes of the legislation, are distinguished by character-
istics sufficiently marked and important to make them a class by themselves.”); State 
ex rel. Budd, 48 A. at 1024 (asking whether the classification “arbitrarily separates 
some persons” and considering the “appropriateness” of a statute’s provisions to 
those the statute excludes). 
 229 Town of Secaucus, 628 A.2d at 294. 
 230 Vreeland v. Byrne, 370 A.2d 825, 850 (N.J. 1977) (Pashman, J., dissenting). 
 231 Town of Secaucus, 628 A.2d. at 305 (Stein, J., dissenting). 
 232 Vreeland, 370 A.2d at 850 (Pashman, J. dissenting); Town of Secaucus, 628 A.2d 
at 305 (Stein, J., dissenting). 
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In the special law analysis of the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act, 
the observations from Parking Authority of Atlantic City, while not carry-
ing the weight of law, shed some light on the special law conse-
quences of Atlantic City’s unique constitutional status.233  The mere 
fact that the New Jersey Constitution affords Atlantic City separate 
treatment in regard to gambling does not justify, by itself, separate 
treatment in other regards.234  In fact, even a law expressly aimed at a 
problem collateral to the allowance of gambling in Atlantic City re-
quires a direct nexus between gambling and the problem.235  A law 
classifying Atlantic City for separate treatment must at least have a 
conceivable, legitimate purpose to which the classification is ration-
ally related, 236 and may require such a relationship to the law’s actual 
purpose.237
IV. SPECIAL LAW ANALYSIS OF THE NEW JERSEY SMOKE-FREE AIR ACT 
A. General Application 
Since the Supreme Court of New Jersey has viewed the special 
law analysis as essentially unchanged over the past 100 years,238 the 
court could apply any one of the several formulations of the analysis 
described herein to determine whether the New Jersey Smoke-Free 
Air Act, with its exception of casinos, constitutes a special law.  The 
issue, in the language of the oldest New Jersey special law case,239 is 
whether the indoor smoking ban embraces all members of the class—
indoor public areas—that it is naturally related to, and whether the 
ban creates a preference for casinos and establishes inequalities for 
other indoor areas.240
Using the Harvey formulation, the class that is excluded—
casinos—would be the crucial factor in the analysis.241  If casinos 
should not be encompassed by the law, then the law is not rendered 
 233 Parking Auth. of Atlantic City v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 434 A.2d 676, 682–
84 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1981). 
 234 Id. at 682. 
 235 Id. at 684. 
 236 Id. at 680–84. 
 237 See supra notes 168–74 and accompanying text. 
 238 See Paul Kimball Hosp., Inc. v. Brick Twp. Hosp., Inc., 432 A.2d 36, 44 (N.J. 
1981) (listing several formulations of the analysis, starting with the Budd formulation 
from 1901, as in agreement with one another). 
 239 State ex rel. Van Riper v. Parsons, 40 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1878). 
 240 See id. at 9. 
 241 See Harvey v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 153 A.2d 10, 15 (N.J. 1959). 
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special by virtue of the exclusion.242  Another Harvey requirement for 
the ban to be considered a general law is that the indoor areas to 
which it is applied, bearing in mind the purpose of the legislation, 
must be distinguished from casinos by characteristics sufficiently 
marked and important to make them a class by themselves.243
Under the Vreeland formula, most recently used in Town of Secau-
cus,244 the Supreme Court of New Jersey would first need to discern 
the purpose and object of the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act.245 Then 
the court would have to decide whether the facts presented—the al-
lowance of smoking in an indoor public area, casino floors, while 
smoking is disallowed in all other indoor public areas—demonstrate 
a rational basis relevant to the purpose and object of the act for the 
exception of casinos from the otherwise broad legislation.246
These restatements of the special law analysis in the context of 
the New Jersey smoking ban shed little light on the likely outcome of 
such an analysis.  Rather, the outcome depends on whether the court 
requires the classification to bear a reasonable relationship to the ac-
tual or primary purpose of the legislation, or merely to bear such a 
relationship to any conceivable purpose.247  Under either test, it is 
important to note that the mere fact that Atlantic City is distin-
guished by the New Jersey Constitution for separate treatment in the 
context of gambling likely does not render other separate treatment 
constitutionally permissible per se.248  On the other hand, the mere 
fact that the law applies only to one municipality does not render it 
unconstitutionally special per se.249
B. Any Conceivable Purpose Analysis 
If the Supreme Court of New Jersey interprets the purpose as-
pect of the special law analysis to allow for any conceivable purpose, 
then the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act will almost certainly be up-
held as constitutionally valid.  The stated and primary purpose of the 
 242 See id. 
 243 See id. 
 244 Town of Secaucus v. Hudson County Bd. of Taxation, 628 A.2d 288, 294 (N.J. 
1993). 
 245 See Vreeland v. Byrne, 370 A.2d 825, 829 (N.J. 1977). 
 246 See id. 
 247 See supra notes 175–210 and accompanying text (discussing cases such as Har-
vey, Vreeland, and Town of Secaucus that seem to employ the purpose aspect of the 
analysis in various manners). 
 248 Parking Auth. of Atlantic City v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 434 A.2d 676, 682 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1981). 
 249 Paul Kimball Hosp., Inc. v. Brick Twp. Hosp., Inc., 432 A.2d 36, 46 (N.J. 1981). 
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ban is to promote the public interest by protecting the “nonsmoking 
majority of the public” from the hazard of secondhand smoke in in-
door public places and workplaces.250  An argument that the excep-
tion of certain indoor areas is rationally related to this public health 
end, if possible, would clearly be strained.  However, under this tradi-
tional rational relationship analysis, the exception does not become 
invalid for failure to bear a rational relationship to the stated purpose 
of the legislation.251
One could certainly conceive that the purpose of the casino ex-
ception to the Smoke-Free Air Act is to protect the economic interest 
of Atlantic City, a major New Jersey tourist attraction, against compet-
ing tourist areas that allow smoking in casinos.252  The New Jersey 
Legislature expressly recognized the value of a thriving Atlantic City 
to the “general welfare, health and prosperity of the State” when it 
decided to use gambling as “a unique tool of urban redevelopment” 
for the city.253  Furthermore, at least one study, albeit one that was 
sponsored by the New Jersey Casino Association and criticized by op-
ponents of the casino exemption, concluded that a smoking ban in 
casinos would cause gamblers to choose other tourist destinations, 
costing the state millions in tourism revenue and costing thousands 
of casino employees their jobs.254  Recognition that a smoking ban in 
casinos could undercut efforts to maintain Atlantic City’s prominence 
as a tourist attraction255 may have been balanced by the legislature 
against the public interest in protecting the nonsmoking majority 
from secondhand smoke256 in enacting the Smoke-Free Air Act with 
the exception. 
Finding a conceivable purpose for the exception of casinos to be 
the protection of tourism in Atlantic City,257 the various formulations 
 250 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-56 (West 2006). 
 251 See Mahwah v. Bergen County Bd. of Taxation, 486 A.2d 818, 827 (N.J. 1985) 
(“[T]he court is not limited to the stated purpose of the legislation, but should seek 
any conceivable rational basis.”). 
 252 See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text. 
 253 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-1(b).  The statute also states that “the restoration of At-
lantic City as the Playground of the World and the major hospitality center of the 
Eastern United States is found to be a program of critical concern and importance to 
the inhabitants of the State of New Jersey.”  Id. 
 254 Gurney, Odds Against A.C., supra note 83, at B01. 
 255 See Holl, supra note 73, at 6 (explaining casino operators fear that such a ban 
would result in gambler tourists deciding to go to Las Vegas or Native American-run 
casinos rather than Atlantic City). 
 256 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-56. 
 257 A broader statutory purpose may exist in balancing the protection of public 
health with the economic interests of Atlantic City and other exempted areas. 
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of the special law analysis clearly favor the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air 
Act being upheld.  Under the State ex rel. Van Riper test, the statute 
may still create a preference for casinos.258  However, the class that 
the ban was meant for would not naturally embrace casinos, as the 
purpose of protecting the economic interest of Atlantic City would 
place a natural limit on the otherwise broad class.259
Likewise, in the language of Harvey, the conceivable economic 
interest purpose could dictate that casinos should not be encom-
passed by the law.260  Bearing this purpose in mind, the indoor areas 
to which the ban is applied, or conversely, the indoor areas to which 
the exception is applied, would be “distinguished by characteristics 
sufficiently marked and important to make them a class by them-
selves.”261  The characteristic distinguishing casinos from essentially 
all other indoor public areas,262 the importance of casinos to the eco-
nomic interest of Atlantic City,263 obviously bears a direct relation to 
the purpose of economic protection.  Thus, interpreting the purpose 
aspect of the Harvey test to allow for any conceivable purpose clearly 
results in a finding that the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act withstands 
a special law attack. 
Finally, the Vreeland analysis yields the same result.  Allowing for 
any conceivable purpose, the court could discern the purpose,  or at 
least a purpose, of the statute to be the protection of Atlantic City’s 
tourist industry.264  The facts presented—the allowance of smoking in 
an indoor public area, casino floors, while smoking is disallowed in all 
other indoor public areas—would then represent a perfectly rational 
result in terms of this purpose,  reflecting the legislative decision that 
Atlantic City’s casino floors must be exempted from the indoor smok-
ing ban in order to achieve the purpose of economic protection. 
The federal court decision in Coalition for Equal Rights, Inc. v. 
Owens265 foreshadows this predicted outcome of a New Jersey special 
law challenge should the Supreme Court of New Jersey employ a tra-
ditional rational relationship approach.  In Owens, the court found 
the economic protection of Colorado’s casinos against less regulated 
 258 See State ex rel. Van Riper v. Parsons, 40 N.J.L. 1, 9 (N.J. 1878). 
 259 See id. 
 260 See Harvey v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 153 A.2d 10, 15 (N.J. 1959). 
 261 Id. at 14. 
 262 See supra note 69 (listing the other classes of establishments that are exempt 
from the ban). 
 263 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-1(b) (West 2006) (describing casinos as a “unique 
tool of urban redevelopment” for Atlantic City). 
 264 See Vreeland v. Byrne, 370 A.2d 825, 829 (N.J. 1977). 
 265 No. 06-CV-01145, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42723 (D. Colo. June 23, 2006). 
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Native American competitors to be a conceivable purpose to which 
Colorado’s exception of casinos from its indoor smoking ban was ra-
tionally related.266  Were the Supreme Court of New Jersey to apply 
the traditional rational relationship test to the virtually identical New 
Jersey statute and exception, and in consideration of a virtually iden-
tical statutory purpose, the court would almost certainly come to an 
identical conclusion—the validity of the statute.267
C. Actual or Stated Purpose Analysis 
If the New Jersey Supreme Court interprets the purpose aspect 
of the special law analysis to require a rational relationship to the ac-
tual or stated purpose of a statute, then the New Jersey Smoke-Free 
Air Act faces a far more significant obstacle in a special law challenge.  
While the protection of the state’s economic interest in a thriving At-
lantic City is certainly a plausible purpose for the statute’s exception 
of casinos, the statute recites no such purpose or findings that would 
support such a purpose.268  In fact, the scant269 information available 
on the legislators’ intent in including the exception suggests that the 
exception developed not as an economic consideration, but as a con-
ciliatory gesture to “the powerful casino industry and its allies in the 
legislature’s South Jersey delegation” in order to ensure passage of 
the bill.270
Admittedly, the casino lobby’s intent in opposing the bill was 
likely purely economic.271  One might argue that this economic, pol-
icy-based concern was transferred to the legislature in the legisla-
ture’s adoption of the casino exception.  However, no part of the leg-
islative history indicates that the legislature made any determination 
 266 Id. at *17. 
 267 See supra notes 251–65 and accompanying text. 
 268 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-56 (reciting the legislative findings relevant to the 
smoking ban). 
 269 See supra note 84 (explaining that the legislative history on the Smoke-Free Air 
Act contains no hearing transcripts, debate transcripts, or witness testimony, and is 
essentially limited to restatements of the bill’s language). 
 270 Holl, supra note 73, at 6; see also Gurney, Odds Against A.C., supra note 83, at 
B01 (describing the “public-health advocates” of the smoking ban in the legislature 
as accepting the casino exemption as a political necessity in the face of casino lobby 
opposition despite the secondhand smoke hazards that casino employees face, and 
quoting the chairman of the senate’s health committee describing the exemption as 
undesirable but necessary to secure the needed votes); Ung, supra note 82, at B01 
(describing an assemblywoman who sponsored the bill as regretting that the exemp-
tion of casinos was necessary to secure the bill’s passage). 
 271 See Gurney, Odds Against A.C., supra note 83, at B01 (describing the economic 
analysis that served as the foundation for the “formidable offensive” that the New Jer-
sey Casino Association mounted against the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act). 
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on the potential economic harm to the casinos from the smoking ban 
or that such potential harm outweighed the recognized272 benefits to 
public health that the smoking ban created.273  Rather, the statements 
of legislators that supported the bill indicate simply that, considering 
the sway of the casino lobbying group in the state legislature, the ex-
emption was a political necessity.274  Since the mere appeasement of a 
powerful lobbying group is not a legitimate government purpose for 
legislation or an exemption thereto, and is in fact the very evil the 
New Jersey special law prohibition was meant to prevent,275 the ap-
parent or actual purpose of the New Jersey indoor smoking ban 
seems limited to the stated purpose, that being the protection of the 
nonsmoking majority’s health.276
Limiting the special law analysis to this actual and stated pur-
pose, rather than considering any conceivable purpose, tilts the 
analysis toward a finding that the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act con-
stitutes unconstitutional special legislation.  In the terms of State ex rel. 
Van Riper, the statute seemingly fails to embrace a class—casinos—to 
which the statute is naturally related, as casinos possess no quality 
relevant to the public health purpose of the statute that distinguishes 
them from other indoor areas.277  Thus, the statute seems to “create 
preference and establish inequalities,” rendering it an unconstitu-
tional special law.278
The Harvey test similarly favors a finding of the New Jersey smok-
ing ban’s unconstitutionality when limited to the stated and apparent 
purpose of the statute.  Focusing, as Harvey requires, on the class ex-
 272 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-56. 
 273 See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text. 
 274 Id. 
 275 Vreeland v. Byrne, 370 A.2d 825, 828 (N.J. 1977) (quoting 2 SUTHERLAND, 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 40.01 (4th ed. 1973)) (explaining that the very evils spe-
cial law prohibitions developed to combat were the “propensities of legislatures to 
indulge in favoritism”); see also Gurney, Group Sues, supra note 88, at B01 (quoting 
Rutgers University School of Law Professor Robert Williams that “[i]n a political 
sense, th[e] distinction was completely rational, because it wasn’t going to pass oth-
erwise.  But that’s not the way it would be interpreted in a court of law.”). 
 276 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-56.  Even Senator Adler’s rather tepid defense of the 
exemption, that “[t]he state is allowed to draw rational distinctions about what it 
regulates and why it regulates it,” was made in reference to an equal protection chal-
lenge to the legislation, not a special law challenge.  Gurney, Group Sues, supra note 
88, at B01.  As previously discussed, this defense may not be relevant to a special law 
analysis, as such an analysis may require the distinction to be rationally related to the 
stated or actual purpose of the legislation, rather than merely any conceivable pur-
pose.  See supra notes 168–69, 184–210 and accompanying text. 
 277 State ex rel. Van Riper v. Parsons, 40 N.J.L. 1, 9 (N.J. 1878). 
 278 Id. 
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cluded from the legislation,279 it seems evident that the public health 
purpose offers no basis for casinos falling outside the legislation’s 
scope.  In other words, no “sufficiently marked and important” char-
acteristics, “bearing in mind the [public health] purpose[] of the leg-
islation,” distinguish casinos from other indoor areas covered by the 
ban.280
Confining the Vreeland formula to the stated or actual purpose of 
a statute281 would also very likely result in a finding that the New Jer-
sey Smoke-Free Air Act violates the New Jersey Constitution as a spe-
cial law.  Such a limitation would dictate that the “purpose and object 
of the enactment,” to be determined as the first step of the Vreeland 
analysis,282 is the protection of the nonsmoking majority’s health.283  
This purpose offers no rational or reasonable basis for the exception 
that the factual situation presents, that being the exception of casinos 
from a smoking ban encompassing virtually all other indoor areas.284  
As the dissents in both Vreeland and Town of Secaucus implied, a limita-
tion of the special law analysis to exclude conceivable but unstated or 
unintended purposes to the challenged legislation dramatically in-
creases the likelihood that the challenged legislation will be struck 
down as special.285
One state court has in fact evaluated a smoking regulation 
against a state constitutional prohibition of special laws.  In City of 
Tucson v. Grezaffi,286 an Arizona appellate court considered a smoking 
regulation requiring that restaurants have separate smoking areas,287 
but not making the same requirement of bars and bowling alleys.288  
The court described the test of an allegedly special law as follows: 
In order to withstand a challenge as special legislation, a law must 
meet each of the following criteria: it must bear a rational rela-
tionship to a legitimate legislative objective; any classification the 
 279 Harvey v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 153 A.2d 10, 15 (N.J. 1959). 
 280 Id. 
 281 The language of the test, requiring a determination of “the purpose and object 
of the enactment,” and the application in that case would seem to suggest such a 
construction.  Vreeland v. Byrne, 370 A.2d 825, 829 (N.J. 1977). 
 282 Id. 
 283 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:3D-56 (West 2006). 
 284 See Vreeland, 370 A.2d at 829. 
 285 See id. at 850 (Pashman, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s failure to 
consider any conceivable purpose led to its holding that the challenged legislation 
was special); Town of Secaucus v. Hudson County Bd. of Taxation, 628 A.2d 288, 305 
(N.J. 1993) (Stein, J. dissenting) (same). 
 286 23 P.3d 675 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001). 
 287 Id. at 679. 
 288 Id. at 682. 
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law creates “must apply uniformly to all cases and to all members 
within the circumstances provided for by the law”; and the law 
“must be elastic, or open, not only to admit entry of additional 
persons, places, or things attaining the requisite characteristics, 
but also to enable others to exit the statute’s coverage when they 
no longer have those characteristics.”289
Using this test, the court found that the smoking regulation’s sepa-
rate treatment of bars and bowling alleys did not constitute a special 
law.290
Even ignoring the differences between New Jersey’s smoking ban 
and the far more limited city ordinance at issue in Grezaffi, a subtle 
difference between the Arizona and New Jersey special law tests ren-
ders the Arizona appellate decision of little guidance to the New Jer-
sey special law analysis of the Smoke-Free Air Act.  Under the Arizona 
test, the challenged law must bear some rational relationship to a le-
gitimate objective.291  However, the test states no requirement that the 
disputed classification or exception have any rational relationship to 
that or any objective.292  Hence, because the smoking regulation in 
Arizona was rationally related to the legitimate purpose of public 
health, the court did not consider whether the exclusion of bars and 
restaurants bore any relationship to that objective, or any objective.293
New Jersey, on the other hand, requires that the “classification 
can be said to rest upon any rational or reasonable basis relevant to 
the purpose and object of the act” for the statute containing the clas-
sification to be held valid as a general law.294  Thus, unlike in Arizona, 
both the statute and any classification therein must be found to bear 
a rational relationship to at least some conceivable legitimate purpose 
for the statute to withstand a special law challenge.295  Because of this 
higher standard in New Jersey, at least compared to the Arizona spe-
cial law analysis as applied in Grezaffi, the Arizona appellate court’s 
decision is of little significance to the New Jersey special law analysis 
 289 Id. at 683 (quoting Republic Inv. Fund I v. Town of Surprise, 800 P.2d 1251, 
1257–58 (Ariz. 1990)). 
 290 Id. at 683–84. 
 291 Id. at 683. 
 292 See Grezaffi, 23 P.3d at 683.  While the requirement that the classification “apply 
uniformly to all cases and to all members within the circumstances provided for by 
the law” may inject some consideration of the reasonableness of the classification, 
the court in Grezaffi did not consider the factor in a manner parallel to the New Jer-
sey requirement that the classification bear some rational relationship to the purpose 
of the legislation.  See id. 
 293 See id. at 683–84. 
 294 Vreeland v. Byrne, 370 A.2d 825, 829 (N.J. 1977). 
 295 Id. 
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of its smoking ban.  Rather, the question remains one likely to be de-
termined by clarification of the purpose aspect of the special law 
analysis by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.296
CONCLUSION 
New Jersey’s special law cases simply do not paint a clear picture 
of the analysis courts would apply to the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air 
Act.297  Those cases that not only recite but also apply a traditional ra-
tional relationship analysis, considering any conceivable purpose as a 
basis for a classification, clearly weigh in favor of a finding that the 
smoking ban is a constitutionally permissible general law.298  Those 
that either recite that same standard but apply a more stringent one, 
or simply require an actual or stated purpose to be considered as the 
only possible basis for a classification, lean in the opposite direc-
tion—that the New Jersey Smoke-Free Air Act violates the New Jersey 
Constitution as a special law.299
 
 296 See supra notes 248–86 and accompanying text. 
 297 See supra notes 226–37 and accompanying text. 
 298 See supra notes 250–67 and accompanying text. 
 299 See supra notes 268–85 and accompanying text. 
